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The purpose of this paper is to study identification and estimation of causal effects in experiments
with multiple sources of noncompliance. This research design arises in many applications in education
when access to oversubscribed programs is partially determined by randomization. Eligible households
decide whether or not to comply with the intended treatment. The paper treats program participation
as the outcome of a decision process with five latent household types. We show that the parameters
of the underlying model of program participation are identified. Our proofs of identification are constructive
and can be used to design a GMM estimator for all parameters of interest. We apply our new methods
to study the effectiveness of magnet programs in a large urban school district. Our findings show that
magnet programs help the district to attract and retain students from households that are at risk of leaving
the district. These households have higher incomes, are more educated, and have children that score
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The purpose of this paper is to study identiﬁcation and estimation of causal eﬀects
in experiments with multiple sources of noncompliance. In a standard experimental
design, each subject agrees to participate in the experiment and randomization com-
pletely determines whether the individual is assigned to the treatment or the control
group.1 In our design, randomization gives potential participants the option to par-
ticipate in the program, i.e. individuals that win a lottery can choose whether or not
to participate in the program. Individuals thus decide whether or not to comply with
the intended treatment. This type of research design arises in many applications in
education.2 Many school districts use lotteries to determine access to over-subscribed
educational programs. Lottery winners are accepted into the program, with the ulti-
mate choice of attendance left to the student and his family. Households have many
diﬀerent outside options and as consequence there are diﬀerent reasons for noncom-
pliance. Lottery losers do not have the option to participate in the program. Program
participation then depends on lottery outcomes as well as on household decisions.
We follow the literature on program evaluation and allow for heterogeneity in the
eﬀect of treatment. This approach was introduced into economics by Quandt (1972),
Heckman (1978) and Lee (1979).3 This approach shares many similarities with the
causal model of potential outcomes introduced by Rubin (1974) into the statistical
literature. Our approach of modeling noncompliance in experimental designs builds
on the work by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) (AIR) who also study an ex-
1See, for example, Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) for an overview of the program evaluation
literature.
2Angrist (1990) introduced the use of lotteries to study the impact of military service on earnings.
Of course, in his application program participation is mandatory: the penalties of avoiding the draft
were quite signiﬁcant.
3Heckman and Robb (1985) and Bjorklund and Moﬃtt (1987) treated heterogeneity in treatment
as a random coeﬃcients model.
1perimental design in which compliance is not perfect: some individuals assigned to
treatment do not take it, and some not assigned to treatment do take it. They refer
to the two non-complying types as “never-takers” and “always-takers.” There is also
a third type that does exactly what its assignment requires. These are referred to as
“compliers.”
Our approach focuses on experimental designs that arise in educational economics.
Our application focuses on the eﬀectiveness of magnet programs. To study these
experimental designs, we generalizes the framework by allowing for additional types
of non-compliance. These additional types arise because households face two outside
options: they can send their children to a non-magnet school within the school district
or they can leave the school district. If there are no schooling options outside the the
public school district, our model simpliﬁes to the one considered in AIR.
Since we need to account for two diﬀerent sources of non-compliance, our model
has ﬁve latent types. The ﬁrst type is a “complying stayer” who chooses the magnet
program if it wins. The second type is a “non-complying stayer” who does not choose
the magnet program even if he wins the lottery. Both of these types stay in the
district whether they lose the lottery.4 The third and forth types leave the district
if they lose the lottery. The third type is a “leaver” and will not enroll its child in
the district independently of the outcome of the lottery.5 The fourth type complies
with the lottery and participates in the magnet program if it wins the lottery. We
denote these households as “at risk.” Given that many urban school districts are
4The district oﬀers a standard education program to all households that do not win the lottery.
5Households have incomplete information and need to gather information to learn about the
features of diﬀerent programs. Households have to sign up for lotteries months in advance. At that
point, they dot not have accumulated all relevant information. Once they have accumulated all
relevant information, they may decide to opt out of the public school system since their preferred
choice dominates the program oﬀer by the district. Note that there are typically no penalties in
participating in the lottery and declining to participate in the the program.
2experiencing declining enrollment, this type is important from a policy perspective.
Finally, there is a ﬁfth type that always takes the magnet option regardless of the
outcome of the lottery. The household types are latent, i.e. unobserved by both the
researcher and the school district administrators.
One key objective of the analysis is then to identify and estimate the proportions
of these ﬁve latent types and to characterize diﬀerences in observed characteristics
among these types. Estimating these parameters allows to study whether magnet
schools are eﬀective in attracting and retaining students and households. We show
that the parameters of the underlying framework of program participation are non-
parametrically identiﬁed. Our proofs of identiﬁcation are constructive and can be
used to design a GMM estimator for all parameters of interest (with respect to re-
tention.) We can thus study the eﬀectiveness of various programs that try to attract
and retain students.
We then investigate whether we can identify and estimate the causal eﬀect of the
program on other potential outcomes such as achievement, attainment, or suspension.
Evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the program on these other outcomes is more diﬃcult
due to the underlying selection problems. We provide conditions that allow us to
identify and estimate (local) average treatment eﬀects for “complying stayers.” We
also show that it is impossible to identify the eﬀects for “students at risk” without
imposing additional assumptions on the selection process. One key result in AIR is
that the standard instrumental variables regression using random assignment as an
instrument gives the local average treatment eﬀect for compliers. In our research
design the standard IV estimator only yields a consistent estimator of the (local)
average treatment eﬀect, if the fraction of “at risk households” is negligible, i.e. if we
only have one type of “compliers.” If there are two diﬀerent types of compliers the
IV estimator does not identity a local average treatment eﬀect.
Our estimation approach is also closely related to linear IV estimators that have
3been commonly used in the related empirical literature to study attraction and reten-
tion eﬀects.6 We show in this paper that two of the most popular linear estimators
have well-deﬁned interpretations within our framework of program participation. We
derive the probability limits of the standard “intend-to-treat” OLS estimator and
the IV estimator, that uses the outcome of the lottery as an instrument for program
participation.7 We show that the probability limits of these estimators are func-
tions of the parameters of our framework. The GMM estimator that we develop is
more comprehensive and provides full identiﬁcation of all parameters of interest. Our
approach thus provides a uniﬁed interpretation of most commonly used linear esti-
mators. More importantly, it also provides additional insights that are outside the
scope of traditional linear estimators.
We apply the techniques developed in this paper to study the eﬀectiveness of mag-
net programs in a mid-sized urban school district. While debates surrounding the
eﬀectiveness of other school choice options such as charter schools and educational
vouchers have grabbed much attention from researchers and policymakers, magnet
programs have gotten less attention despite the fact that they are much more preva-
lent than charter schools or educational voucher programs. A second objective of this
6Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), for example, have advocated in a recent, inﬂuential study the
use of linear estimators to analyze open enrollment school choice in the Chicago Public Schools.
Lotteries were also used by Rouse (1998) to study the impact of the Milwaukee voucher program.
Hoxby and Rockoﬀ (2004) also use lotteries to study Chicago charter schools. These estimators have
been used by Ballou, Goldring, and Liu (2006) to examine a magnet program. Hastings, Kane, and
Staiger (2006) estimate a model of school choice based on stated preferences for schools in Charlotte.
Since school attendance was partially the outcome of a lottery, they use the lottery outcomes as
instruments to estimate the impact of attending the ﬁrst choice school. Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom,
King, and Kremer (2002) study the eﬀects of vouchers when there is randomization in selection of
recipients from the pool of applicants.
7Angrist and Imbens (1994) discuss identiﬁcation and estimation of local treatment eﬀects. Heck-
man and Vytlacil (2005) provide a general framework for econometric policy evaluation.
4paper is to provide new research to understand the causal eﬀects of magnet programs.
Our application focuses on magnet programs operated by a mid-sized urban school
district. Our ﬁndings show that magnet programs help the district to attract and
retain students from households that are at risk of leaving the district. These house-
holds have higher incomes, are more educated, and have children that score higher
on standardized tests than households that stay in district regardless of the outcome
of the lottery. These households have many options outside the public school system,
but apparently, they view the existing magnet programs as desirable programs for
their children. We also ﬁnd evidence that the market for elementary school competi-
tion is more competitive than the market for middle and high school education. The
fraction of households at risk declines with age of the students. Magnet programs are
most eﬀective in attracting households that have young school-age children.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our new methods
for estimation of treatment eﬀects when program participation is partially determined
by lotteries. We discuss identiﬁcation and estimation. We also show that commonly
used linear IV estimators can be interpreted as partially identifying diﬀerent com-
ponents of our framework. Section 3 provides some institutional background for our
application and discusses our main data sources. Section 4 reports the empirical
ﬁndings of our paper. Finally, we oﬀer some conclusions and discuss the policy im-
plications of our work in Section 5.
2 Identiﬁcation and Estimation of Causal Eﬀects
2.1 The Research Design
We consider a research design in which program participation is only partially deter-
mined by randomization, i.e. a design with multiple sources of noncompliance. These
5designs arise when randomization occurs at the application stage. An applicant that
receives a favorable random draw in the lottery has the option to participate in the
program. But winning applicants are not required to participate and hence can opt
out before the program begins. This design thus diﬀers from the standard experimen-
tal design in which randomization occurs after individuals have already committed
to participate in the program. Since our application focuses on magnet school, we
will develop our methods within this context. However, the methods derived in this
paper apply quite broadly and are not restricted to the application that we study.
Consider the problem of a household that has to decide whether or not to enroll
a student in a magnet program oﬀered by a school district.8 We only consider house-
holds that have decided to participate in a lottery which determines access to the
program. Let W denote a discrete random variable which is equal to 1 if the student
wins the lottery and 0 if it loses. Let w denote the fraction of households that win
the lottery. A student that wins the lottery has three options: participate in the pro-
gram, participate in a diﬀerent program oﬀered by the same school district, or leave
the district and pursue educational opportunities outside the district. A student that
loses has only the last two options. Let M be 1 if a student attends the (magnet)
program and 0 otherwise. Finally, let A denote a random variable that is one if a
student attends a school in the district and 0 otherwise.
The key idea behind our method is to use ﬁve latent types to classify households
into compliers and non-compliers. We make the following assumption
Assumption 1
1. Let sm denote the fraction of “complying stayers.” These households will remain
in the district when they lose the lottery. If they win the lottery, they comply
8We use the terms “household” to describe the decision maker and “student” to describe the
person that participates in the program.
6with the intended treatment and attend the magnet school.
2. Let sn denote the fraction of “noncomplying stayers.” These households will
remain in the district when they lose the lottery. If they win the lottery, they
will not comply with the intended treatment and attend a non-magnet school in
the school district.
3. Let l denote the fraction of “leavers.” These are households that will leave the
district regardless of whether they are admitted to the magnet program.
4. Let r denote the fraction that is “at risk.” These households will remain in the
district and attend the magnet program if admitted to the magnet program, and
they will leave the district otherwise.
5. Let at denote the fraction of “always-takers.” They will attend the magnet school
regardless of the outcome of the lottery.
Comparing our approach to the one developed in AIR, note that we have two
types of “never-takers” that we denote by “noncomplying stayers” and “leavers.”
Similarly we have two types of “compliers” that we denote by “complying stayers”
and “at risk households.” The main diﬀerence thus arises because individuals have
two outside options instead of one as assumed in AIR. If we assume that there are
no school options outside the district, i.e. if l = r = 0, then our experimental design
is identical to the one studied in AIR.
Since the household type is latent, one key empirical problem is identifying and
estimating the proportions of each type in the underlying population. If we can
accomplish this goal, we can study the eﬀectiveness of magnet programs in attracting
and retaining households that participate in the lottery. Moreover, we are often
interested in how these types of households diﬀer along observed characteristics. For
example, we would like to test the hypothesis that households that are classiﬁed to
7be “at risk” are more likely to have higher levels of income than “stayers.” Hence we
would like to characterize the type of households that are most likely to leave if they
are not oﬀered a place in the magnet program.
To formalize these ideas, consider a random variable X that measures an observed
household characteristic such as income or socio-economic status. Appealing to our
decomposition, let µr, µsm, µsn, µl and µat denote the mean of random variable X
conditional on belonging to group r, sn, sm, l, and a respectively. The goal of the ﬁrst
part of the analysis is then to identify and estimate the following eleven parameters
(w,r,sn,sm,l,a,µr,µsm,µsn,µl,µat).9
In addition to studying the eﬀectiveness of magnet programs on attraction and
retention of students, we also like to study the eﬀects of the program on other stu-
dent outcomes. Let T be an outcome measure of interest, for example, the score on
a standardized achievement test. Following Fisher (1935), we adopt standard nota-
tion in the program evaluation literature and consider a model with three potential
outcomes:
T = A M T1 + A (1 − M) T0 + (1 − A) T2 (1)
where T1 denotes the outcome if the student attends the magnet school and T0 if he
attends a diﬀerent program in the district where T2 denotes the outcome outside of
the public schools.10 We will later assume that T is not observed for students that do
not attend a public school within the district, i.e. if A = 0, then T is not observed.
This assumption is plausible since researchers have typically only access to data from
one school district. Private schools rarely provide access to their conﬁdential data.
9It is straight forward to allow X to be a vector.
10This model is often referred to as the switching regression model due to Quandt (1972) and
Maddala (1983). It also known in the statistical literature as the Rubin Model developed in Rubin
(1974, 1978). It also shares many similarities with the Roy Model as discussed in Heckman (1979)
and Heckman and Honore (1990).
8Attention, therefore, focuses on the treatment eﬀect ∆ = T1 − T0. Note that ∆
is unobserved for all students. Conceptually, we can deﬁne ﬁve diﬀerent average
treatment eﬀects, one for each latent group.11
ATEType = E[T1 − T0|Type = 1] Type ∈ {Sn,Sm,R,L,At} (2)
We also study whether we can identify and estimate these types of treatment eﬀects.
2.2 Identiﬁcation
First we need to establish the information set of the researcher.
Assumption 2 The researcher observes probabilities and conditional means for the
following eight outcomes:
Table 1: Observed Outcomes
W M A Pr{W,M,A} E[X|W,M,A] = E[X|M,A]
I 1 1 1 w (r + sm + at)
rµr+smµsm+atµat
r+sm+at
II 1 1 0 not possible
III 1 0 1 w sn µsn
IV 1 0 0 w l µl
V 0 1 1 (1 − w)at µat
VI 0 1 0 not possible
VII 0 0 1 (1 − w) (sn + sm)
snµsn+smµsm
sn+sm
VIII 0 0 0 (1 − w) (r + l)
rµr+lµl
r+l
11There are other eﬀects that may also be of interest such as treatment eﬀect on the treated or
the marginal treatment eﬀect. For a discussion see, among others, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
and Moﬃtt (2008).
9Note that only six of the eight outcomes listed in Table 1 are possible.
Identiﬁcation can be established sequentially. First, we discuss identiﬁcation of the
probabilities that characterize the shares of the latent types. We have the following
result.
Lemma 1 The parameters (w,r,sn,sm,l,a) are identiﬁed by the six non-degenerate
probabilities in Table 1.
Proof: Parameter w is the fraction that wins the lottery:
w = Pr(W = 1,M = 1,A = 1) + Pr(W = 1,M = 1,A = 0) (3)
+ Pr(W = 1,M = 0,A = 1) + Pr(W = 1,M = 0,A = 0)
Given w, sn is identiﬁed from (1,0,1):
sn = Pr(W = 1,M = 0,A = 1)/w (4)
l is identiﬁed from (1,0,0):
l = Pr(W = 1,M = 0,A = 0)/w (5)
at is identiﬁed from (0,1,1):
at = Pr(W = 0,M = 1,A = 1)/(1 − w) (6)
Given w and sn, sm is identiﬁed form (0,0,1):
sm = Pr(W = 0,M = 0,A = 1)/(1 − w) − sn (7)
Given at, l, sn, sm, r is identiﬁed of the identity:
r = 1 − l − sm − sn − at (8)
Q.E.D.
10Note that there is no over-identiﬁcation at this stage since the six probabilities
in Table 1 add up to one, and the last three non-degenerate probabilities add up to
1 − w. Next we discuss identiﬁcation of the four conditional means. We have the
following result.
Lemma 2 Given (w,r,sn,sm,l,at), the parameters (µr,µsm,µsn,µl,µat) are identi-
ﬁed by the ﬁve non-degenerate conditional expectations observed in Table 1.
Proof: µl is identiﬁed from (1,0,0):
µl = E(X|W = 1,M = 0,A = 0) = E(X|M = 0,A = 0) (9)
Similarly µsn is identiﬁed from (1,0,1):
µsn = E(X|W = 1,M = 0,A = 1) = E(X|M = 0,A = 1) (10)
and µat is identiﬁed from (0,1,1):
µat = E(X|W = 0,M = 1,A = 1) (11)
Given µsn, µsm is identiﬁed from (0,0,1):
µsm = [(sn + sm)E(X|W = 0,M = 0,A = 1) − snµsn]/sm (12)
Given µsm and µat, µr is identiﬁed from (1,1,1):
µr = [(r + sm + at)E(X|W = 0,M = 0,A = 1) − smµsm − atµat]/r (13)
Q.E.D.
Note that there is one over-identifying condition at this stage. This restriction
arises due to the condition that W is orthogonal to X.12
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 then imply the following result:
12The lotteries are assumed to be fair and blind in the sense that the district does not pre-select
winners and losers based on beliefs about attendance or any socio-economic or student characteristic
found in X.
11Proposition 1 The parameters (w,r,sn,sm,l,at,µr,µsm,µsn,µl,µat) are identiﬁed.
We now turn to the analysis of identiﬁcation of causal treatment eﬀects of magnet
programs on educational and behavioral outcomes. We make the following assumption
regarding observables:
Assumption 3 We assume that the researcher only observes outcomes, T, for stu-
dents that remain in the school district, i.e. we do not observe outcomes for “leavers”
and “at risk households” that lose the lottery.
It is useful to assume initially that we observe the latent household type. Table
2 provides a summary of the relevant conditional expectations.13 Conditioning on
lottery outcomes, there are eight conditional expectations. Three of these pertain to
outcomes that are not observed if we observed the latent type since students in these
latent groups leave the school district. The remaining ﬁve conditional expectations
relate to household types that remain in the district.
Table 2: Mean Outcomes Conditional on Type
Complying Non-Complying Always
Stayers Stayers At Risk Leavers Takers
W = 1 E[T1|Sm = 1] E[T0|Sn = 1] E[T1|R = 1] E[T2|L = 1] E[T1|At = 1]
W = 0 E[T0]Sm = 1] E[T0|Sn = 1] E[T2|R = 1] E[T2|L = 1] E[T1|At = 1]
Note that T2 is never observed.
13Note that we are implicitly assuming that the mean performance of stayers who would decline
lottery admission is the same whether they win or lose the lottery, i.e. E[T0|Sn = 1,W = 1] =
E[T0|Sn = 1,W = 0] = E[T0|Sn = 1].
12From Table 2, it is evident that even if we observed the latent type, there is
little hope in identifying ATESn, ATER, ATEL, or ATEAt without imposing some
additional assumptions on the underlying selection process. For stayers that never
attend the magnet program, we cannot identify E[T1|Sm = 1]. For students at risk,
we cannot identify E[T0|R = 1]. For leavers, we can neither identify E[T1|L = 1] nor
E[T0|L = 1]. For always-takers we never observe E[T0|At = 1]. We thus have the
following result:
Proposition 2 Without imposing additional assumptions on the selection of students
into latent groups, ATESn, ATER, ATEL and ATEAt are not identiﬁed.
Attention, therefore, focuses on identiﬁcation of ATESm.
Since we do not observe the latent type, Assumption 3 implies that we only observe
mean outcomes for the students conditional on W, M and A. For students who win
the lottery and attend the magnet school, we observe
E[T1|W = 1,M = 1,A = 1] =
smE[T1|Sm = 1] + rE[T1|R = 1] + atE[T1|At = 1]
sm + r + at
(14)
For students who lose the lottery and attend the magnet school, we observe
E[T1|W = 0,M = 1,A = 1] = E[T1|At = 1] (15)
We also observe mean performance of stayers who lose the lottery:
E[T0|W = 0,M = 0,A = 1] =
smE[T0|Sm = 1] + snE[T0|Sn = 1]
sm + sn
(16)
Finally we also observe the mean performance of stayers who win the lottery and
decline to enroll in the magnet program:
E[T0|W = 1,M = 0,A = 1] = E[T0|Sn = 1] (17)
Equations (16) and (17) imply that we can identify E[T0|Sm = 1] and E[T0|Sn = 1],
since sn and sm have been identiﬁed before. Equations (15 implies that we can identify
13E[T1|At = 1]. However equation (14) then implies that it is diﬃcult to separately
identify E[T1|Sm = 1] and E[T1|R = 1]. As a consequence we have the following
result:
Proposition 3
i) E[T0|Sm = 1], E[T0|Sn = 1] and E[T1|At = 1] are identiﬁed.
ii) If r = 0, then E[T1|Sm = 1] and ATESm are identiﬁed.
iii) If r 6= 0 and E[T1|Sm = 1] = E[T1|R = 1], then ATEsm is identiﬁed.
iv) If r 6= 0 and E[T1|Sm = 1] 6= E[T1|R = 1], then ATEsm is not identiﬁed without
imposing further assumptions.
We oﬀer the following observations:
a) Recall that if r = l = 0 are research design simpliﬁes to the one considered in AIR.
This case is covered in Proposition 3 (i) and (ii).
b) Attrition per se is not the problem. If membership in the at risk group is negligible
(i.e., r = 0), identiﬁcation is achieved even if the fraction of leavers, l >> 0, is large.
c) If controlling on observables is suﬃcient to deal with the selection problem, a
matching approach can be justiﬁed.14 We can thus generalize the result in Proposition
3 (iii) by conditioning on X.
d) The lack of identiﬁcation discussed in Proposition 3 (iv) arises from the at risk
group. If stayers and at risk students diﬀer by unobserved characteristics, we have a
standard selection problem.
e) If we assume that E[T1|Sm = 1] ≤ E[T1|R = 1], then equation (14) implies that
(sm + r + at)E[T1|W = 1,M = 1,A = 1] − atE[T1|At]
sm + r
≥ E[T1|Sm = 1] (18)
and we can construct an upper bound for ATEsm.
14For a discussion of matching estimators, see, among others, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Abadie and Imbens (2006).
142.3 A GMM Estimator
Suppose we observe a random sample of N applicants to a magnet program, indexed
by i. We view these as N independent draws from the underlying population of
all applicants to this magnet program. Let Wi,Mi,Ai,Xi now denote the random
variables that correspond to observation i.
Note that the proofs of identiﬁcation are constructive. Replacing population
means by sample means thus yields consistent estimators for the parameter of in-
terests. Nevertheless it is useful to place the estimation problem with a well deﬁned
GMM framework. This allows us to estimate simultaneously all parameters and com-
pute asymptotic standard errors. We can estimate the fractions of each latent type
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Hence the parameters of the model can be estimated using a GMM estimator (Hansen,
1982).15 Note that the estimator above easily generalizes to the case in which X is
vector of random variables. We simply stack all orthogonality conditions to obtain a
simultaneous estimator that exploits all relevant orthogonality conditions.
2.4 Interpreting Commonly Used OLS and IV Estimators
There exists a close relationship between the GMM estimator discussed above and
some more commonly used OLS and IV estimators. Here we assume that at = 0 which
is consistent with most applications in educational economics. To simplify notation,
let s = sn + sm denote the total fraction of stayers.
First, we consider an estimator that is also some called the “intend-to-treat”
estimator since it does not account for actual program participation. We have the
following result:
Proposition 4
Consider the linear regression model:
Ai = β0 + β1Wi + ui (21)
where E[ui|Wi] = 0. Let ˆ β0 and ˆ β1 be the probability limits of the least squares
estimators. Under standard regularity assumptions ˆ β0 = s + at and ˆ β1 = r.









16The intercept is the sum of the proportion who are stayers and the proportion who
are always takers. The slope of the OLS equation is the fraction of at-risk students
in the magnet school applicant pool.
Proof: Let a denote the proportion of magnet applicants that attend school in the
district. From the deﬁnitions given at the outset: a = s + wr + at. Let q denote the
fraction of students that win the lottery and attend a school in the district. Then,
from the deﬁnitions presented at the outset: q = w(r + s + at).
Consider the normal equations of the least squares estimators. After dividing by














































































s + wr + at − w(r + s + at)
1 − w
= s + at (25)
Q.E.D.
Next we consider a linear IV estimator that uses the outcome of the lottery as an
instrument from program participation. This estimator is the preferred estimator in
most empirical studies and has, for example, been advocated by Cullen et al. (2006).
Proposition 5 Consider the linear regression model
Ai = γ0 + γ1Mi + vi (26)
17where E[vi|Wi] = 0, i.e. Wi is used as an instrument for Mi. Let ˆ γ0 and ˆ γ1 denote
the probability limits of the standard exactly identiﬁed linear IV estimator. Under
standard regularity assumptions we have ˆ γ0 = s + at and ˆ γ1 = rw
m , where m is the
fraction of magnet school applicants who subsequently attend a magnet school.
The intercept is again the sum of the proportion who are stayers and the proportion
who are always takers. The slope of the IV equation is the fraction of magnet school
attendees who are at-risk students.
Proof: Consider the normal equations for the standard IV estimator.16 After dividing


























a = s + wr + at
m = w(r + sm) + at (28)
q = w(r + s + at)





















































(s + at)(1 − w)
(1 − w)
= s + at (31)
16In standard textbook notation these are Z0y = Z0Xb γ.
18Q.E.D.
Finally, we consider the linear model:
Ti = α0 + α1Mi + wi (32)
We consider properties of the standard IV estimator that uses Wi as an instrument





















i=1 Mi(1 − Wi)
. PN
i=1(1 − Wi)
where d cov denotes the sample covariance and the last equality follows from the binary
nature of the instrument. We assume that the estimator is implemented using a
random sample of students for which we observe (Ti,Mi,Wi). In our application
these are the students that are participating in a program oﬀered by the district. The
sample thus does not include students that left the district. We have the following
result that parallels our ﬁnding in Proposition 3:
Proposition 6 If r = 0, then
ˆ β
IV → E[T1|Sm] − E[T0|Sm] (34)
If r 6= 0, the limit of the IV estimator does not converge to any of the commonly used
treatment eﬀects.
Proof:
Let N denote the sample size, NW the number of students that win the lottery, NW,M
the number of students that win the lottery and attend the program, and NW,NM the
number of students that win the lottery and do not attend the program. We assume
19standard regularity conditions apply, so that sample means converge (almost surely)
to population means.
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Mi(1 − Wi) → (1 − w)
at
sm + sn + at
(38)
= (1 − w) D






Suppose r = 0, then
ˆ β
IV → E[T1|Sm] − E[T0|Sm] (40)
This eﬀect can also be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment Eﬀect since the
students for which Sn = 1 are the ones that will be aﬀected by a change in the lottery
outcome. Q.E.D.
Note that Angrist et al. (1996) consider the simpliﬁed version of our model with
only three latent types assuming l = r = 0. The IV estimator then identiﬁes the Local
Average Treatment Eﬀect. In the more general case, the limit of the IV estimator
depends of the mean outcomes of all ﬁve types and the relative proportions of these
latent groups. Cullen et al. (2006) consider an application with r ≈ 0. Hence the IV
estimator used in that paper is consistent and can be used to estimate the relevant
local treatment eﬀects.
3 Data
Our application focuses on magnet programs that are operated by a mid-sized urban
school district that prefers to not be idnetiﬁed. There are magnet programs for all
grade levels, and each program has a slightly diﬀerent focus. For example, there is
an elementary school magnet program that focuses on international studies and the
French language. We only consider magnet programs that are academically oriented.
Every academic year, interested students submit applications for one magnet program
of their choice. If the number of applications submitted during registration for any
magnet program exceeds the number of available spaces, the district holds a lottery
to determine the order in which applicants will be accepted.
21In the case of over-subscription, a computerized random selection determines each
student’s lottery number. The lottery is binding in the sense that students with
lower numbers are accepted, higher numbered students are rejected. There is a clear
cut-oﬀ number that separates the groups. We do not observe students attending
magnet schools that lose the lottery. We therefore abstract from “always-takers” in
the following analysis.
To preserve racial balance in the magnet programs, separate lotteries are held for
black students and other students. Some programs also have preferences for students
with siblings already attending the magnet programs. Separate lotteries are held for
those students with an acceptable preference category for each magnet program. All
in all, each lottery is held for a given program, in a given academic year, separately
by race, and, ﬁnally, separately by preference code.
Table 3: Lottery Participant Characteristics
Variable Entire Sample Elementary School High School
Applicants Only Applicants Only
Math Test Score 1304.9 (207.9) [1049] - 1276.5 (195.7) [627]
Reading Test Score 1310.2 (244.4) [1048] - 1311.5 (258.7) [627]
Sex 0.5123 (0.5000) [2151] 0.5121 (0.5000) [871] 0.5195 (0.5000) [820]
Race 0.7209 (0.4487) [2268] 0.5691 (0.4955) [912] 0.8409 (0.3660) [861]
FRL 0.3322 (0.4711) [2161] 0.3375 (0.4731) [871] 0.3195 (0.4666) [820]
Poverty 0.2282(0.1407) [2162] 0.2177 (0.1358) [872] 0.2344 (0.1456) [820]
Education 0.2949 (0.1933) [2162] 0.3417 (0.2253) [872] 0.2513 (0.1457) [820]
Lottery Win 64.8 56.3 78.3
Listed as mean, (std dev), [observations]
22Lottery winners (lotteried-in) have the option to participate in the magnet pro-
gram, with the ultimate choice of participation left to the student and his family.
Lottery losers (lotteried-out) do not have this option, and thus must make their
schooling choice without the availability of the magnet option. When winners decline
admission, the students on the wait list become eligible. Again the rank on the wait
list is determined by the original lottery. With a fair and balanced lottery, the winners
and losers will be determined by chance, thus creating two groups that are similar to
each other both on observable and unobservable characteristics.
The district granted us access to its longitudinal student database. This database
currently has information from the 1998-1999 school year through 2006-2007. In
addition to demographic data, the database contains detailed information about edu-
cational outcomes. This information is linked to each student by a unique ID number.
The demographic characteristics for the students include race, sex, free/reduced lunch
eligibility, and addresses. Using the addresses, we can assign census tract variables
such as poverty and adult education levels to each student. We use two community
characteristics that measure the socio-economic composition of the neighborhoods in
which students reside. Poverty is the percentage of adults in the student’s census
tract with an income level below the poverty line. Education is the percentage of
adults in the student’s census tract with at least a college degree.
As pertaining to student educational outcomes, the database includes the school
of attendance in each year, standardized test scores for the state assessment test. The
database also contains the outcomes of the magnet lotteries. One of the key features
of the database is that it contains unusually good information about students residing
in the district that attend private, charter, and home schools. Unfortunately, we do
not observe test scores for students outside of the district.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the entire sample used in this study as well
as two important sub-samples that we also consider in estimation. We only consider
23binding lotteries in this research because treatment and comparison groups are re-
quired for the experimental design. In total, over the time frame of the data, there are
203 binding lotteries with 1,396 students lotteried-in and 981 students lotteried-out.
Before we implement the estimators, we check whether the lotteries are balanced
on student observables to ensure a clean experimental design. While assignment
within lotteries may be random, participation in a lottery is not. To make use of
within-lottery randomness and not the between-lottery non-randomness, we perform
a check for balance by running a lottery-ﬁxed eﬀect regression for each observable
characteristic as a dependent variable with acceptance as the only independent vari-
able other than the ﬁxed eﬀects. Separate lotteries are held by race, so race is left out
of the balance analysis. We test every other observable student characteristic in the
data set. Following Cullen et al. (2006) we use equation (41) to determine whether
the lottery is balanced:
Xi = β1Wi +
J X
j=1
Iijβ2j + vi (41)
where Xi is the observable characteristic of interest, Wi is a dummy equal to one if
student i wins lottery j, Iij is an indicator variable if i participated in lottery j, and
vi is the error term.17 We estimate a separate regression for each observable. The
coeﬃcient β1 determines the fairness of the lottery system. If we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that it is equal to zero, then acceptance into a magnet is not determined
by the value of that particular student observable.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 shows the results when all students in all binding
lotteries are included in the regressions. β1 is not signiﬁcant for any tested variable
at 10 %. The second and third columns consider the two sub-samples of interest.
The second column includes all students in elementary school while the third column
17Alternatively we could use multivariate Behrens-Fisher type test statistics which require less
restrictive assumptions. See, for example, Kim (1992).
24Table 4: Balance of Prior Student Characteristics Between Lottery Winners and
Losers
Variable Entire Sample Elementary School High School
Applicants Only Applicants Only
Math Test Score 21.19 (15.04) [1049] - 31.76* (19.24)* [627]*
Reading Test Score 28.37 (17.99) [1048] - 22.26 (26.13) [627]
Sex 0.0034 (0.0267) [2161] 0.0245 (0.0389) [871] -0.0087 (0.0472) [820]
Race 0.0017 (0.0047) [2268] 0.0058 (0.0073) [912] 0.0009 (0.0083) [861]
FRL 0.0036 (0.0234) [2161] 0.0161 (0.0328) [871] 0.0275 (0.0433) [820]
Poverty -0.0051 (0.0069) [2162] -0.0024 (0.0093) [872] -0.0195 (0.0134) [820]
Education 0.0038 (0.0078) [2162] 0.0095 (0.0126) [872] -0.0007 (0.0123) [820]
*Signiﬁcant at 10%
focuses on high school students. The last group of students is similar to the one
chosen by Cullen et al. (2006). This particular subset of students showed low overall
attrition and, perhaps more importantly, similar attrition rates for lottery winners
and losers. We ﬁnd that the estimate of β1 is rarely signiﬁcant, even at the 10% level.
This supports our earlier assumption about the orthogonality of W and X.
The results shown in Table 4 support the notion that the lotteries are fair, cre-
ating separate winner and loser groups that are similar in all known characteristics.
Any diﬀerences between winners and losers are small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Therefore, this randomized design theoretically also balances the two groups on un-
observable characteristics such as motivation and parental involvement. This holds
for the overall population in binding lotteries and for smaller sub-samples that were
tested.
254 Empirical Results
Since the lotteries appear to be balanced, our research is valid and we implement our
new estimators. The results are summarized in Table 5. We report estimates and
estimated standard errors of the fraction of households in each latent class as well as
some relevant household characteristics. The characteristics include race, gender, free
or reduced lunch, poverty, and college education. Note that the last two measures
are based on neighborhood characteristics as reported by the U.S. Census. We report
estimates for the full sample of all students as well for the subsample of students that
applied to a magnet program that was associated with an elementary school.18
Table 5 reveals some interesting new insights into the application process and
the decision making process of households. We ﬁnd that the probability of winning
the lottery is 0.65 if we average over all programs. The fraction of households that
we estimate to be at risk is substantial and consist of 19 percent of the underlying
population. Among the 73 percent of households that are not at risk, the vast majority
will attend the magnet program if they win they lottery. There are only 9 percent
of households that will leave the district regardless of the outcome of the lottery.
Overall, these results suggest that most households consider the magnet programs
desirable. Our estimates imply that approximately 250 households – 12 percent of
the underlying sample – decided to stay in the district because they won the magnet
lottery.
Equally interesting are the characteristics of the households that are at risk. For
each characteristic, the diﬀerences across household types (at risk, leavers, stayers)
18We illustrate our approach by combining data across similar magnet programs. Ideally we would
like to apply our approach to individual programs, but the sample sizes are too small to precisely
estimate causal eﬀects by program for almost all programs, except perhaps the ﬁve largest programs.
The largest program contributes 491 observations to our sample.
26Table 5: Empirical Results
All Schools Elementary Schools
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
Win 0.65 0.01 0.56 0.02
Fraction At Risk 0.19 0.02 0.22 0.03
Stay Attend Magnet 0.64 0.02 0.59 0.03
Stay-Non Magnet 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.01
Leave 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01
At Risk 0.58 0.05 0.46 0.06
Black Stay-Magnet 0.81 0.01 0.69 0.03
Stay-Non Magnet 0.67 0.04 0.31 0.08
Leave 0.43 0.04 0.28 0.06
At Risk 0.55 0.05 0.60 0.07
Female Stay-Magnet 0.52 0.02 0.50 0.03
Stay-Non Magnet 0.53 0.05 0.52 0.09
Leave 0.37 0.04 0.39 0.06
At Risk 0.16 0.04 0.18 0.05
FRL Stay-Magnet 0.43 0.02 0.46 0.03
Stay-Non Magnet 0.26 0.04 0.29 0.08
Leave 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.03
At Risk 0.21 0.01 0.20 0.02
Poverty Stay-Magnet 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.01
Stay-Non Magnet 0.23 0.01 0.18 0.02
Leave 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.01
27Table 5: Empirical Results (cont.)
All Schools Elementary Schools
Coeﬃcient Std. Error Coeﬃcient Std. Error
At Risk 0.34 0.02 0.42 0.04
College Stay-Magnet 0.27 0.01 0.30 0.01
Stay-Non Magnet 0.32 0.02 0.41 0.04
Leave 0.38 0.02 0.40 0.04
# Observations 2268 905
are statistically signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that these households are on average less likely
to be African American and on free or reduced lunch programs than households that
are stayers. Moreover, they come from more aﬄuent and better educated neigh-
borhoods.19 We thus conclude that magnet programs are eﬀective devices for the
school district to retain more aﬄuent households. Not surprisingly, the group that
are leavers are the most aﬄuent group. These households may just apply to the
magnet programs as a back-up option in case their students should unexpectedly not
be admitted to an independent, charter, or parochial school.20
Table 5 also provides estimates when we restrict attention to households that
apply to programs that provide education for children in elementary school. These
programs are slightly more competitive as can be seen from the lower probability
of winning (0.56 versus 0.65). Moreover, these programs attract a more educated
19Note that the diﬀerences in household characteristics are statistically signiﬁcant from zero at all
conventional levels.
20It could also be that these households left the district because of job transfers or other issues
unrelated to schools.
28clientele. The fraction of African American families is also lower in this subsample.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the fraction of at risk families and the fraction of leavers
is also higher in this sample. This ﬁnding highlights the fact the market for elementary
school education is more competitive than the market for high school education.




Fraction At Risk 0.06 0.04
Stay Attend Magnet 0.83 0.04
Stay-Non Magnet 0.06 0.01
Leave 0.05 0.01
At Risk 1399 169
Math Stay-Magnet 1261 13
Stay-Non Magnet 1262 45
Leave 1347 45
At Risk 1380 165
Reading Stay-Magnet 1299 16
Stay-Non Magnet 1238 42
Leave 1413 56
# Observations 530
Finally, we consider the results for high school applicants. This sub-sample is
interesting since we observe test scores for all students in these subsample. We can
thus analyze sorting based on ability measured by prior test scores. We implement
our GMM estimator using the full set of observed characteristics. In Table 6. we
29only report the results that pertain to attraction and retention as well as to sorting
by ability.21
Results are reported in Table 6. We ﬁnd that the fraction of households that are
at risk and leavers are much smaller than in the full sample. Overall Table 6 provides
some evidence in favor of ability sorting. Households that are considered to be at
risk have on average children with higher math and reading test scores. Households
that stay in the district regardless of the outcome of the lottery have the lower test
scores. We thus conclude that magnet program retain higher ability students who
would leave the district in the absence of these programs.
5 Conclusions
We have considered a research design in which program participation is only partially
determined by randomization. These designs arise when randomization occurs at the
application stage and potential participants that are randomized into the program
can always opt out before the program begins. These designs are commonly used to
determine access to oversubscribed program oﬀered by public school systems. We have
developed a new empirical method which classiﬁes potential participants in to stayers,
leavers, and those that are at risk. The last group of individuals are most interesting
form a policy perspective since the decision to participate crucially depends on the
outcome of the lottery. We have shown that the parameters that characterize the
causal eﬀects are identiﬁed and can be estimated using a GMM estimator. Commonly
applied IV and OLS estimators partially identify key components of our framework.
We have applied our new methods to study the eﬀectiveness of magnet program in
attracting and retaining students and households in a mid-sized urban school district.
21The full set of results are available upon request from the authors.
30Our ﬁndings suggest that magnet programs are useful tools that help the district to
attract and retain students from middle class backgrounds. These households have
many options outside the public school system. It is considerably more diﬃcult to
study the impact of these programs on achievement because of attrition and selection.
Some households that do not win the lottery decide to leave the district and pursue
other school options for their children. These households have very diﬀerent observ-
able characteristics then the households that stay behind. It is therefore plausible to
assume that households also diﬀer in unobserved characteristics. As a consequence,
our experimental design allows us to point identify and estimate the eﬀects associ-
ated with retention and attraction of students. For other treatment eﬀects we can
construct informative bounds.
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